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AUSTRALIA'S "MOST EXTREME CASE": A NEW
ALTERNATIVE FOR U.S. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LIABILITY REFORM
Steven T. Masada

t

Abstract: The United States currently confronts a severe increase in medical costs
and a simultaneous decrease in the availability of health care services. A nearly identical
situation recently emerged in the Commonwealth of Australia. This phenomenon, often
labeled the "medical malpractice crisis," results in part from an increasing litigious trend
spurred on by the appeal of potentially enormous damage awards. More lawsuits filed
and increased award amounts raise the liability of health care providers and generate
uncertainty in the medical malpractice insurance market. This in turn drives up the costs
of insurance policy premiums and ultimately forces health care providers to diminish
their delivery of health services. In response, many states implement reform initiatives
that cap the maximum amount recoverable for an injured patient's non-economic loss.
Australian jurisdictions, by contrast, take a more comprehensive approach to liability
reform that incorporates a minimum loss requirement and a calculation scheme that
proportions non-economics damage awards based on a hypothetical "most extreme case."
The Australian approach not only limits the quantum of damages available to plaintiffs,
but also produces more consistent damage awards than the U.S. cap approach. That is,
Australian-style reform reduces the uncertainty posed to insurers in estimating their
policyholders' liability. In turn, insurers can more accurately set rates.
The reform model followed by Australia is appropriate for the United States. If
implemented, it would alleviate inefficiencies created by certain features unique to the
U.S. legal system, including civil jury trials and contingency fee agreements. The
regulation of non-economic damage awards in a manner consistent with Australia's
reform thus presents a desirable model for U.S. policymakers, state legislatures, and the
federal government to emulate in the current medical malpractice crisis.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The "medical malpractice crisis" refers to the drastic upward surge in
health care providers' liability insurance premiums that ultimately has
encumbered patients' access to affordable health care.1 Sometimes dubbed
the "hidden defendants" in malpractice litigation,2 insurance companies are
t
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I See Jerome Nates, Damages, in 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 18.15 (David W. Louisell & Harold
Williams eds., 2002). "Not surprisingly, public concern about the torts system ebbs and flows with the
availability of liability insurance and accordingly, these crises are more aptly referred to as a crisis of the
tort litigation/liability insurance system." Michael Mills, Lessonsfrom America: ProfessionalLiability and
Tort Reform, AUSTRALIAN BAR REV., at *73, Dec. 20,1994, available at LEXIS, News Library.
2 See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 80 (1995).
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an indispensable party in an accurate analysis of the medical malpractice
crisis. 3 When payouts on insurance policies increase, insurance companies
raise premium rates to secure adequate profits.4 Across the United States,
medical malpractice insurance rates have escalated rapidly without evidence
that patient care has deteriorated. 5 Certain higher-risk practice areas, such as
internal medicine, obstetrics/gynecology, and surgery face the most
significant insurance increases.6 Consequently, emergency room doctors are
walking off the job,7 physicians are closing their practices and moving to
states with more favorable laws, 8 and pregnant women cannot obtain
prenatal care. 9 The burden ultimately falls upon patients, who face higher

costs and limited access to quality health care. °
In response to the ensuing public outcry, many state legislatures have
limited the liability of health care providers to patients for non-economic
losses-intangible harms, such as pain and suffering." These states place 12a
losses.
statutory maximum on the amount recoverable for non-economic
3 See Lee L. Bennett, Defense Community Issues: New Liabilities and How to Respond to the
Plaintiffs'Bar,DEF. COUNS. J. 273, 283 (July 2002); Michael Mills, Insurance and ProfessionalLiability The Trend of Uncertainty Or: Negligence and the High Court - A Practitioner'sPerspective, INS. L. J., at
*13, November 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library. "Tort law and liability insurance enjoy a
symbiotic relationship. Neither could exist without the other .... " Id. at *13, n.21.
4 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY

SYSTEM 12 (July 24, 2002); see also Mills, supra note 3, at *13.
5
6

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4.
See id.

7 See, e.g., Grace Vandecruze, Has the Tide Begun to Turn for Medical Malpractice?, HEALTH
LAWYER, December 2002, available at WESTLAW, News Library; Health Care Liability Alliance, How
Litigation, at
Lawyers Profit from
While
are Suffering
Patients and Doctors
http://www.carh.net/pdfs/hcla.pdf (last visited June 23, 2003); see also Stefanie Balogh & Andrew
McGarry, Doctors Push for Negligence Law Reform, AUSTRALIAN, July 3, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News Library (noting that 500 Queensland medics refused to work in protest of insurance costs).
' See Health Care Liability Alliance, supra note 7; Rachel Zimmerman & Christopher Oster,
Assigning Liability: Insurers 'Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice "Crisis", WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002,
available at http://www.pasenate.com/medmal/wsj.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
9 See Zimmerman & Oster, supra note 8.
'O See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES supra note 4; Nates, supra note 1.
See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. Damage awards for non-economic loss have been long
recognized as a legitimate element in the American and English civil justice systems. See DAN DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135-39 (1973). Compensatory damages, unlike punitive damages,
are intended to compensate the injured patient for the losses incurred through the negligence of another. Id.
These losses are further partitioned into two sub-categories: economic loss and non-economic loss. Id.
While economic damage awards refer to financial costs incurred by the plaintiff as a result of injury, noneconomic damage awards involve financial compensation for intangible losses. Oftentimes such damages
are labeled simply as pain and suffering, but include damages for physical and emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of
society and companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages,
injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature. Id.
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While insurance premiums continue to rise across the nation, states with
such damage caps experience more moderate increases.13
A similar phenomenon also reached crisis levels in Australia.' 4 As in
the United States, high insurance premiums caused physicians to walk off
the job, eliminate risky practice areas, and relocate to less litigious
jurisdictions.1 5 In response, state and territorial legislatures enacted, or are
in the process of enacting, sweeping liability reform designed to limit the
quantum of damages recoverable by any one plaintiff in a personal injury or
wrongful death action.' 6 This Australian legislation, in addition to setting a
maximum amount recoverable for non-economic losses, clearly delineates a
17
damage calculation scheme and imposes a minimum loss requirement.
Such comprehensive reform, in turn, significantly reduces health care
providers' liability and enhances predictability and consistency for insurers.
The state of New South Wales has pioneered the reform movement with its
Civil Liability Act.' 8 Although Australian liability reform is in its early
stages, early indications suggest that its regulation of damage awards will
markets and ensure the public's access to affordable
stabilize insurance
9
health care.'

U.S. reform proponents, state legislatures, and the federal government
should look abroad to Australia when reformulating the liability of health
care providers in U.S. courts. 20 The Australian approach functions as an
Damages for non-economic losses constitute up to half of total damages paid in medical related
injury suits. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 55 (1991).
13 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 14-18.
14 The United States and Australia are being compared because both are industrialized nations with
advanced health care systems and adversarial legal systems founded on the English common law paradigm.
See Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogenization? The Globalization of Law and Legal Ethics-An
Australian Viewpoint, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173, 1185 (2001) (noting that the similarities between
U.S. and Australian society far outweigh the differences). Although this Comment only compares
Australia and the United States, the dilemma over medical malpractice insurance is an international crisis.
15 See The Hon. Justice Michael Kirby, Medical Malpractice - An International Perspective on Tort
System Reforms, Speech at the Conference of the Royal College of Physicians, (Sept. 11, 2000), available
at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj tortsystermhtm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) [hereinafter
Kirby Speech].
16 See, e.g., Civil Law (Wrongs) Act, 2002 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and
Damages) Act, 2003 (N. Terr.); Civil Liability Act, 2002 (Tas.); Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability
Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vict.); Civil Liability Act 2002 (W. Austl.); Personal Injuries Proceedings
Act, 2002 (and Regulations) (Queensl.); Wrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment
Act, 2002 (S. Austl.).
'7 See infra Part IV.B.
1 Civil Liability Act, 2002 (N.S.W.).
I9 See, e.g., Australian Medical Association, AMA Report Card on State and Territory Tort Law
http://www.ama.com/au/web.nsf/doc/SHEDat
2002),
available
(Nov.
Activity
Reform
5FUUFW/$filerrLReform.pdf (last visited June 29, 2003) [hereinafter AMA Report Card].
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & David F. Partlett, An America's Cup for Tort Reform? Australia
and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 443, 456 (1988) (beckoning Americans to look to

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 13 No. I

effective method, superior to the U.S. cap system, that moderates both the
21
severity and uncertainty of potential medical malpractice damage awards.
If implemented, reform styled after the Australian approach would advance
the underlying goals pursued by U.S. reform proponents and minimize the
effect of litigation-fostering elements imbedded in the U.S. legal system.
This Comment identifies the Australian approach to liability reform as
a viable and sustainable alternative in the current U.S. medical malpractice
crisis. Part II discusses the current medical malpractice crisis occurring in
the United States and Australia. Part III addresses the factors contributing to
the U.S. crisis and notes the legislative response prevalent in the individual
states. Part IV focuses on Australia, noting that the Australian crisis arises
from similar but not identical factors, leading the Commonwealth and
individual states and territories to respond with different reform measures.
Part V compares the drastically different approaches adopted by the United
States and Australia in their respective reform movements, concluding that
the Australian reform model is superior in achieving the underlying goal of
stability in insurance markets. Finally, Part VI examines how Australianstyle reform could operate within the U.S. legal system and recommends that
policymakers consider adopting such an approach, especially in light of
certain crisis-cultivating features unique to the U.S. legal system.
II.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRisIs DEFINED

A medical malpractice crisis develops when rising liability insurance
ultimately hampers patients' access to health care. The availability of
indemnity insurance coverage diminishes as insurance companies refuse to
23
cover certain practice areas, 2 opt to withdraw from the market entirely, or
Australian initiatives in thinking about a reform agenda). American scholars often point to the systems of
foreign countries as an alternative to the current system imposed in the United States. Cf.Randall R.
Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury. Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CtN. L. REV. 53
(Fall 1998); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-Fault"
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001) (suggesting a
switch to a "no-fault" system reminiscent of those in place in New Zealand and Sweden).
2 See infra Part V.
22 See Does Limitless Litigation Restrict Access to Health Care?: Oversight Hearing on Health Care
Litigation Reform Before the House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 107 Cong.
161-63 (2002) (statement of the American Osteopathic Association), June 12, 2002 available at
(last visited Oct. 21,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hjuSOl93.000/hju80193_0.htm
2003) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
23 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 14. In December 2001, St.
Paul Cos., the second largest medical malpractice insurer, discontinued that line of business, reporting a
payout of US$ 1.99 for every US$ 1.00 collected through premiums. Michael Freedman, The Tort Mess,
FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 92. British insurer Marketform warns itwill pull out of Australia. Lisa Allen &
Morgan Mellish, Medical Insurer Threatens To Go, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., October 12, 2002, available at
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24
Because, within the sphere of risk management,
become insolvent.
"profitability" depends on probability and predictability, coverage areas
25
where potential liability is highly uncertain are susceptible to removal.
Insurers must consider not only adverse judgments, but also settlement
26 Shrinking coverage areas create
amounts and other general legal costs.
to set rates
less competitive markets, which allow those remaining insurers
27
at higher levels to hedge against the increased uncertainty.
Higher premiums compel health care providers to undergo a re28
evaluation of their practice, and reconsider those areas that offer the least
likelihood of profitability. In 2001, U.S. doctors spent roughly US$ 6.3
billion in insurance coverage. 29 Because many health care providers are
either unable or unwilling to absorb these premiums, three options exist:
limit the scope of practice by eliminating particularly expensive practice
30
areas; relocate to a jurisdiction that offers lower insurance rates; or
31 Those remaining in the field
abandon the medical profession altogether.
simply apportion increased operating costs to all patients, which in turn
32
burdens the affordability of, and access to, health services.
Sudden increases in insurance premiums struck the United States in
the 1970s and 1980S. 33 California, for instance, endured a medical crisis in

LEXIS, News Library. St. Pauls Insurance pulled out of the Australian malpractice insurance market after
reporting a 2001 loss of $940 million in its global malpractice operation. Stewart Oldfield & Miranda
Mclachlan, Mayne Faces Doubling Insurance Charges, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., April 30, 2002, available
at LEXIS, News Library.
24 For example, HIH Insurance, the largest professional indemnity insurer in Australia, collapsed in
March 2001. Disaster,AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., May 12, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library.
25 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 22.
Approximately 50% of costs incurred by malpractice
26 See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 60-61.
litigation occurs during the pre-trial stage of lawsuits; reducing the sheer number of speculative claims
significantly reduces the payouts bome by indemnity insurers. Id. at 61. Only 34% of malpractice
premiums paid reached plaintiffs as direct compensation while 66% (approximately 46% litigation and
20% administration) was consumed by transaction costs. Californians Allied for Patient Protection, History
of the Creation of MICRA, at http://www.micra.org (last visited June 25, 2003) [hereinafter Creation of
MICRA].
27 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4.
28 id.
29 id.
30 For instance, states with statutory damage caps often offer lower insurance rates. See id.
31 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of the American College of Surgeons). For
example, a Pennsylvania hospital announced it would cease delivering babies in June 2002, citing
insurance costs. Id.
32 See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon et al., The Effects ofMalpracticeLitigation on Physicians' Fees and
Incomes, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 122, 125 (1990). Rising insurance premiums reach consumers through
increased costs, higher taxes, reduced employer coverage, and, ultimately, limited access to quality care.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4.
33 Patricia M. Danzon, Medical MalpracticeLiability, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 101,
101-02 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988).
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the mid-1970s similar to the crisis currently plaguing other states.3 4 When
the frequency of medical injury claims and the severity of jury awards
peaked in 1975, two major California medical liability insurance carriers
refused to renew medical indemnity coverage.3 5 The remaining insurers
significantly raised rates. 36 For example, Travelers' Indemnity Company
raised its premiums to Los Angeles physicians by nearly 500%. 3 7 In
response, many health care providers withheld medical services or simply
refused to work until the government acted to remedy the situation.38 Others
practiced without insurance; an estimated 20% of California doctors were
uninsured at the time. 39 Most health care providers merely passed the
increased costs of premiums on to consumers by raising costs to individual
patients, 40 as well as to employers and the government. 41
Australia's health care system recently reached a similarly chaotic
state as doctors, surgeons, and other health care providers closed their
practices and cancelled certain procedures perceived as high-risk.4 2 Insurers
raised premiums, or left the market altogether, causing unbearable burdens
on health care providers seeking indemnity insurance. 3 At least two of
Australia's largest medical insurers withdrew from the market."4 As in the
U.S. crisis, insurance rates escalated to unbearable levels and, as a result,
health care suffered.45
34
35
36
37

Creation of MICRA, supra note 26.

Id.
Id.

See Martin Ramey, Putting the CartBefore the Horse: The Need to Re-Examine Damage Caps in
California 's ElderAbuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 599, 625-26 (2002).
31 See Creation of MICRA, supra note 26.
39 See Ramey, supra note 37, at 626.
40 See id. at 627.
41 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4.
42 See Kirby Speech, supra note 15. This particularly affected Australia's large rural communities
where the public relies on just a few health care providers for medical services. See, e.g., Mrs. Skinner,
Health Care Liability Bill, Debate at the New South Wales ("NSW") Legislative Assembly, in HANSARD
EXTRACT, June 21, 2001, available at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/phweb.nsf/frames/hansard (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
43 See, e.g., Allen & Mellish, supra note 23; The Contagious Insurance Bug, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, August 5, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library.
44 United Medical Protection ("UMP"), a company that insures 32,000 doctors, constituting 90% of
doctors in New South Wales and approximately 60% of the nationwide market, announced its liquidation.
UMP executives point to the company's inability to cover the estimated AU$ 450 million in claims
outstanding, home out of litigation costs, as the fundamental stimulus to the insurer's demise. Andrew
Webster,
Australian Doctors
Down
Tools,
BBC
News
(April
30,
2002),
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1959303.stm (last visited June 23, 2003). UMP merely
follows the trend set forth by HIH Insurance, the largest professional indemnity insurer in Australia, which
filed for bankruptcy in March 2001. Disaster,supra note 24. "[W]ithdrawal of HIH from the market will
cause a big rise in medical malpractice premiums in 2001 and subsequent years." Id.
'5 See Parliament of Australia, Current Issues Brief No. 10 2001-02, Liability Insurance Premium
Increases:
Causes and Possible Government Responses, March 19, 2002, available at
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS:

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND

INDIVIDUAL STATE RESPONSES

In order to ensure access to affordable health care, policymakers at
both the state and federal levels have focused on the factors that cause this
crisis. In turn, many states have passed damage-capping legislation.
A.

Factors Contributingto the Crisis

While many factors likely contribute to the U.S. medical malpractice
crisis, 46 the most prevalent catalysts for increasing insurance premiums
relate to a rise in medical malpractice litigation and certain inherent
inefficiencies imbedded in the U.S. legal system.
1.

Increases in Size ofAwards and Number of Claims

The growing frequency of malpractice claims and rising severity of
damage awards 47 directly affect insurance rates. The media, members of the
medical and insurance industries, and the public often blame the tort system
for rising health care costs. 48 Medical malpractice claims were rare in the
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/O2ciblO.pdf (last visited June 29, 2003). Australia,
unlike the United States, offers Medicare, a socialized health care system, to it citizens. See Gwen Gray,
Access to Medical Care Under Strain: New Pressures in Canadaand Australia, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 905 (1998). While the immediate burden of increased health care costs falls upon the government,
consumers in Australia suffer from the limited availability of desired services and diminished quality of
care, and contribute to the overburdening rise in insurance through higher taxes. Id.
46 For instance, the events of September 11, 2001, decreasing investment returns, and higher
reinsurance costs severely affected worldwide insurance markets. See Vandecruze, supra note 7; J. Robert
Hunter & Joanne Doroshow, Premium Deceit: The Failure of "Tort Reform " to Cut Insurance Prices,
Center for Justice & Democracy (1999) (blaming the insurance industry's mismanaged underwriting
practices and reliance on investment returns for the recurrent insurance crises).
47 "Frequency" refers to the total number of lawsuits. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort
Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413 (1987).
"Severity" refers to the average amount per paid claim, including jury verdicts and out-of-court settlements.
Id. See also Bennett, supra note 3, at 273. "The costs of the tort system are predicted to soon swamp the
national economy, and already a national insurance crisis is ravaging the nation's essential health care
system." Support H.R. 4600, the "Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, and Timely Healthcare Act of
2002" (the HEALTH Act), available at http://www.neurosurgery.org/socioeconomic/medicalliability/
0802_reasons to support the health act%20I.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2003); see also Christopher S.
Kozak, A Review ofFederal Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Alternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 599,
603-04 (1995).
48 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4. A recent poll conducted by
the Health Care Liability Alliance confirmed that Americans are concerned about the frequency and
severity of medical-related lawsuits. See Four-in-FiveAmericans Concerned about Excess Litigation,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 2002, availableat http://www.tala.com/AI/BG06-12-02.htm (last visited June 23,
2003). The results appear to support a reduction in litigation: 78% of the Americans polled acknowledge
that rising liability costs limit access to health care, 71% agree that litigation is a primary catalyst behind
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United States until the late 1960s, when both the frequency of claims and the
size of jury awards began to increase rapidly. 49 From 1975 to 1984, claims
per physician rose an average rate of 10% a year, and between 1982 and
1986, claim frequency jumped from 13.5% to 17.2%. 50 A study found that
only 8% to 13% of cases filed go to trial, and less than 2% result in a
decision in favor of the plaintiff.5' Most claims-as many as 70%-result in
no payment to the plaintiff.52 Still, insurers must bear the litigation expenses
of defending malpractice claims.53
Increases in the size of all awards are also a substantial contributor to

the crisis.54 Jury awards have grown 175% since 1994. 5 This rapid
increase reflects the rising number of mammoth jury awards.5 6 For example,
before 1995, the state of Mississippi had never experienced an award in
excess of US$ 9 million. Since 1995, however, twenty-one jury verdicts
topped that amount. 57 Although most cases never reach trial, the occasional
huge jury award impairs insurance companies' ability to accurately assess
risk, encourages lawyers and plaintiffs to litigate, and directly influences
parties' willingness and ability to reach settlement.5 8
Together, increases in the size of awards and the number of suits have
devastated the predictability afforded to medical indemnity insurers.59
Between 1999 and 2000, the median jury award increased 43 0/--seven60
times the rate of inflation-to about US$ 3.5 million per plaintiffs verdict.
In turn, settlement amounts grew three-fold. 61 Higher jury awards and
settlements motivate more claims, as injured patients and attorneys attempt
to "cash in," regardless of whether the harm was caused by substandard
skyrocketing insurance rates, and 73% support Congressional action to place reasonable limits on noneconomic damages. Id. Only one of every three Delaware jurors polled believed that "most people who
sue others in court have legitimate grievances," while four of every five agreed that "there are too many
frivolous lawsuits today." Valerie Hans & William Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in
Tort Cases: Implicationsfor the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 85, 94 (1992).
49 See Danzon, supra note 33, at 101.
'o See id. at 102-03.
51 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 8.
52 Id.

53 Id.
54 See Danzon, supra note 32, at 120.
55 See Vandecruze, supra note 7.
51 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 9.
57 Id.

58 Id. at 8. The average payment per paid claim increased from approximately US$ 110,000 in 1987
to $250,000 in 1999. Id. at 10.
59 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 10; Danzon, supra note 33, at
120 (suggesting reform creating a schedule of compensation based on the age of the plaintiff and the
severi7' of injury).
See Oversight Hearing, supra note 22 (statement by the American Medical Association).
61 Id.
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care. 62 In addition, disposing of non-meritorious cases enlarges the costs
borne by insurers. The average cost to defend meritless claims in 2001 was
US$ 22,967, while claims proceeding to trial but resulting in a defense
verdict cost an average of US$ 85,718.63 The trend of rising litigation costs
and decreasing profitability leaves the medical indemnity insurance market
in a state of flux as insurers leave the market and future health care provider
liability remains uncertain.
2.

Civil Juries and Contingency Fees: A Litigious Legal System

The U.S. legal system itself contributes to the increased frequency in
64
which parties resort to litigation. The incentives created by a system that
65
are
agreements
66
preserves the right to civil jury trials and contingency fee
crisis.
malpractice
medical
current
the
to
substantial contributors
a.

The U.S. Civil Jury System

Civil juries have been identified by some as the "central villain in the
67
Use of the jury system
illnesses of the American system of health care.
and exacerbates the
States
adds to the growing litigiousness in the United
68 Juries add time and costs to the litigation
medical malpractice crisis.

69
juries
70
process and augment the uncertainty of liability. In civil litigation,
damages.
assessing
and
fault
assigning
have two primary tasks:
Inconsistency between juries with respect to both tasks often results in the
medical
62 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4 (blaming the legal system for
malpractice crisis).
63 See Oversight Hearing, supranote 22.
of Issues in
6 See Lucille M. Ponte, Reassessing the Australian Adversarial System: An Overview
Court Reform and Federal ADR Practicein the Land Down Under, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 335,
REV. OF
343-46 (2000); David E. Bernstein, ProceduralTort Reform: Lessons from Other Nations, CATO
visited June 29,
BUS. & GOV'T, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl9nle.html (last
2003).
6s U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962).
State
constitutions guarantee similar rights. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
66 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 64; Ponte, supra note 64, at 335-43.
67 See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 4.
legal
68 Id. at 3 (noting "[c]ritics of that system ... argue that the jury is the primary flaw in the
by the
procedures through which disputes over liability and compensation for injuries alleged to be caused
that other
negligence of another are resolved."). For example, physician groups have long argued
Johnson et
physicians and health care providers are the most qualified individuals to decide liability. Kirk
L.
al., A Fault-BasedAdministrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND.
REV. 1365, 1379 (1989).
69 See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 185.
'o See id. at 7-10.
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assessment of significant damage awards without legal fault.7 1 This
encourages plaintiffs with non-meritorious claims to file suit in the hopes
that a jury may find in their favor or that an insurer may opt for settlement in
lieu of risking an adverse jury verdict. 72 All of these factors directly produce
higher insurance premiums.
Many reform proponents claim that the arbitrariness of civil juries lies
at the core of the uncertainty in damage awards.73 Jury awards have risen
dramatically over recent decades, out of proportion to the injuries actually
sustained. 7v Plaintiffs' attorneys wield unlimited freedom when requesting
damage amounts. 75 Juries, as a result, become more accepting of large
awards:
Juries have become accustomed to huge award requests and
they are more willing to reach into the deep pocket of
malpractice insurers to compensate the victims generouslymore willing than when they encounter the victims of
automobile accidents, for in these cases the insurance premiums
at risk are paid directly by the jurors themselves.76
While quantifiable losses limit economic damages, 77 the nebulous categories
79
78
of non-economic losses provide for virtually limitless damage requests.
Studies show that legally insignificant factors significantly affect
jurors' assessment of damages.8 0 Juries award more when they perceive that
the defendant can afford to pay more.8l For instance, a 1991 study noted
71 Id.
72 Id.; see also Kozak, supra note 47, at 619. High damage awards increase settlement amounts in
other cases by setting a higher standard for compensation. See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 3. This is crucial,
considering that less than 10% of medical malpractice suits actually make it to trial. Id. at 5.
73 VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 191-93; accord Peter H. Schuck, Scheduled Damages and Insurance
Contracts for Future Services: A Comment on Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 221
(1991) (noting that, even ifa strict scheduling damage scheme were adopted, difficulties will persist as long
as the jury plays the central role in awarding damages.)
4 See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 191 (between 1975 and 1985, jury awards increased
nationwide 363% from US$ 220,018 to US$ 1,017,716); Health Care Liability Alliance, supra note 7
(average jury award rose 79% between 1993 and 1999).
7 See WEILER, supra note 12, at 48.
76 id.
77 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
79 See Nates, supra note 1, 18.01 [2].
8o See generally, VIDMAR, supra note 2.
s1 Id. at 191 ("What makes the damage awards in professional liability lawsuits particularly
disconcerting is the fact that identical juries will command much higher recoveries in malpractice cases
than in other tort suits...") (quoting American Medical Association (AMA) Specialty Society Medical
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that an amputated leg resulted in a median jury award of US$ 199,999 in
automobile cases, while the same injury caused through physician
malpractice led to a median award of US$ 754,000.82
The average juror lacks legal experience. Without clear guidance by
legal principles, jurors may ttnd to revert to their emotions and sympathies
in assigning fault and damage amounts.83 A typical jury instruction offers
virtually no guidance for how to assess non-economic damages:
The damages for pain and suffering should include such
amounts as you find, by the greater weight of the evidence, is
fair compensation for the actual physical pain and mental
suffering which were the immediate and necessary
consequences of the injury. There is no fixed formula for
evaluating pain and suffering. You will determine what is fair
by applying logic and common sense to the
compensation
84
evidence.
Erratic and unpredictable non-economic damage awards result because
85 While
"juries are left with nothing but their consciences to guide them.,
86 juries often augment pain and
non-economic damages are compensatory,
87
"Doing the right
suffering awards in light of the defendant's conduct.
thing" in88some situations may result in punishing bad actors, not a specific
As a result, a non-economic damage award may exceed its
bad act.
Liability Project, A Proposed Alternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical Liability
Disputes: A Fault-BasedAdministrative System (1988)); see also WEILER, supra note 12, at 48.
82 VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 191.
13 See CLARK HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS
(1988). But see Nelson v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1988) (holding that a court may remit
a verdict where the jury was clearly influenced by sympathy and frustration with the provider's conduct).
84 VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 189 (offering a typical jury instruction for pain and suffering).
" Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning
Compensationinto "Punishment", 54 S.C. L. REv. 47,49 (2002); see also Danzon, supra note 33, at 120.
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979). It is reversible error if the jury does not make
an award for pain and suffering. American States Ins. Co. v. Audubon Country Club, 650 S.W.2d 252 (Ky.
1983) (finding reversible error to accept a verdict for medical expenses with no recovery for pain and
suffering); Bowers v. Sprouse, 254 Va. 428, 492 S.E.2d 637 (1997) (holding jury award for exact amount
of economic damages is inadequate as a matter of law; plaintiff experienced pain, suffering, and
inconvenience for which he is entitled compensation). See also Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 85.
87 See generally, Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 85.
88 Id. The temptation for jurors to disregard the preponderance of evidence presented at trial
increases when they perceive the defendant as deserving punishment, regardless of whether the defendant
caused the harm in this case. See Bernstein, supra note 64. "The jury system seems to show a desire for
punitive [action] and retribution above and beyond the degree of injury-'let's get the rich doctor."'
Reported in United States Accounting Office (U.S. GAO), Report to Congressional Requesters, Medical
Malpractice: Case Study in North Carolina (Dec. 1986) quoted in VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 4.
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89
compensatory function to impose a punitive effect.
Jury awards are erratic and oftentimes unpredictable. 90 Given two
injured patients with identical injuries, socioeconomic situations, and other
material characteristics, two different juries are unlikely to arrive at
comparable damage amounts. 91 In a hypothetical situation, Defendant
physician ("Dr. Defendant") performs surgery on the knee of Plaintiff
patient ("Patient"). Complications caused by Dr. Defendant's negligent care
result in Patient never regaining full range of motion in his knee. Dr.
Defendant also negligently treats Patient's neighbor for the same leg injury,
with the same adverse result. Even assuming both plaintiffs possess
identical material characteristics, (e.g., interests, income, status in society)
the likelihood is slight that two independent juries comprised of individuals
with different backgrounds and values would render similar verdict
amounts. 92 The jury system may award Patient a huge judgment while his
neighbor receives a nominal award, or vice versa. This hypothetical
demonstrates the disparate justice provided to injured patients as well as the
unpredictability posed to health care providers and malpractice insurers in
assigning premium amounts.
While injuries vary in severity, the U.S. cap system93 does not
accommodate for the fact that the most egregious medical errors are the least
likely to occur.94 Medical insurers must accommodate for the variability of
juries and cannot reasonably estimate valuations for potential claims brought
against their policyholders.

The Contingency Fee Agreement

b.

Contingency fee agreements further fuel the legal backlog that
increases litigation costs borne by insurers. 96 Such arrangements allow
attorneys to provide legal services for a fee based on a percentage of the
amount ultimately recovered by the client.97 In theory, parties negotiate the
See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 85.
See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 7.
See id. at 191-93.
Id.
93 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
94 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
9' See infra Part V.B.
96 See Ponte, supra note 64, at 341-42.
97 Victor E. Schwartz et al., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 543
(10th ed. 2000). Before the legal barriers gave way to competing social concerns, any fee arrangements
based on the outcome were not only unethical but also illegal under the torts of chamiperty and
maintenance. See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (And
Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 73 (2000). Chamnperty, a form of maintenance, refers to a
89
90
"'
92
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exact percentage. However, the common rate in the United States is as high
as 40%.98

While contingency fees comprise the backbone of U.S. civil
litigation,99 critics of these types of arrangements cite two fundamental
flaws. First, contingency fees rarely result in a reasonable fee relative to the
legal services provided. 100 Second, by investing their own financial interests
in the case's outcome, the attorneys' interest may no longer mirror their
clients' interests. 10 Ultimately, an incentive arises for attorneys to pursue
more speculative litigation with higher potential payouts.102 Health care
providers and insurers incur more legal costs defending such claims. 0 3 The
increasingly litigious trend in the United States in conjunction with a
litigation-promoting legal system has injured the U.S. health care system and
prompted states to seek legislative remedial measures.
B.

U.S. Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: NonEconomic Damages Caps

Insurance companies assess the potential liability of policyholders and
forecast potential payouts when setting premium rates.' 4 Consequently,
accurate risk assessment necessitates some level of predictability and
certainty with regard to liability. 0 5 Many individual states address this need
for stability and predictability by imposing legislative06 caps on patients'
recoveries for injuries arising from medical negligence. 1
Endeavoring to fully compensate unquantifiable, non-economic losses

bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's claim in
consideration of receiving part of any judgment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (2d ed. 2001); Ponte,
supra note 64, at 341-42.
98 See Schwartz et al., supra note 97. MICRA also limits attorney contingency fees: 40% of the first
US$ 50,000; 33% of the next US$ 50,000; 25% of the next US$ 500,000; and 15% of any amount
exceeding US$ 600,000. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003),
99 All U.S. states recognize such arrangements. See Kenneth A. Ewing, Quantum Meruit in Ohio:
The Search for a FairStandard in Contingent Fee Contracts, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 109, 110 (1992). See
also Martin, supra note 97.
10"Schwartz et al., supra note 97; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 10.
'o' U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 10.
102 A lawyer on a contingency fee has an incentive to develop a portfolio of cases, in hopes that at
least one case results in a huge verdict. Id.; VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 169.
103 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 10.
:04 See id. (noting payouts include adverse judgments, settlements, and other litigation costs).
105 Danzon, supra note 47, at 417; James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better
Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 176 (1991).
40 See Danzon, supra note 47, at 416 (finding the average impact of statutes limiting plaintiffs
recovery has been to reduce average severity of awards by 23%).
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placed on potential defendants reaches a level
is inefficient. 10 7 The burden
08
at which no one benefits.1

"Every system of law must set some bounds to the
consequences for which a wrongdoer must make reparation. If
the burden is too great it cannot and it will not be met, the law
will fall into disrepute and will be a disservice to those victims
who might reasonably have expected compensation. In any
state or society it is ultimately a question of policy to decide the
limits of liability." 10 9
Pain and suffering and other non-economic damages are ready targets due to
10
the inherent arbitrariness in compensating intangible losses.
In the 1970s, a sudden surge in medical malpractice insurance rates
led Congress to convene an emergency hearing.' 1 Congress, however,
respective crises.12
ultimately abstained, leaving the states to manage their
Presently, many state legislatures are seeking to reduce health care
providers' liability and provide stability to insurance markets through
107 See Danzon, supra note 33, at 122; see also Angus Corbett, A Reformulation of the Right to

Recover Compensationfor Medically Related Injuries in the Tort of Negligence, 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 141,
176 (1997) (stating "while the notion of the right to obtain full compensation ... is appealing it is an
ultimately self defeating one.").
108 Mills, supra note 1, at *1; Danzon, supra note 33.
'09 Mills, supra note 1, at *1 n.1 (quoting Lord Hacking, debating civil liability in England).
11o See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
111See Ramey, supra note 37, at 625.
112 Id. Recently, however, the federal government has plunged into the debate and Congress has
entertained several health care reform bills that attempt to incorporate state damage-controlling measures
into federal law. See Kristin Loiacono, A Good Fight in the House over Medical Malpractice "'Reform,"
TRIAL, May 2003, available at WESTLAW, News Library. The reform movement has continued to
intensify since 1995, when then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich pledged a conservative agenda
outlined in the Contract with America. Id. The first bill to address medical malpractice reform
independently, the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care Act of 2002 ("HR 4600"),
appeared in July 2002 and sought "[t]o improve patient access to health care services and provide improved
medical care by reducing the excessive burden the liability system places on the health care delivery
system." See H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2d Seass. 2002). HR 4600 aspired to implement a nationwide cap
on non-economic damages setting the maximum recovery for victims of medical negligence at US$
250,000, mirroring the provision in MICRA. Id.
In September 2002, HR 4600 received approval in the House of Representatives, but later
floundered in the Senate. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Enters the Fray Over Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2003, available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/nw/nw003162.php3 (last visited
June 23, 2003). Since then, supporters of HR 4600 have introduced H.R. 5, a bill nearly identical to HR
4600. See Loiacono, supra. The bill, which also cites as its model California's MICRA, narrowly passed
through the House. Id. The federal government continues to push for health care reform on the federal
level; regardless of whether an initiative passes into law, the repeated attempts to mimic the MICRA
provisions exemplify the United States' rooted adherence to the non-economic damage cap as the method
to ameliorate the insurance crisis.
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predetermined, rigid caps that limit damage awards but allow no flexibility
for the circumstances of each case.1 13 While variations of legislative caps
paradigm mimics that first adopted by
exist, the prevalent statutory
14
California in the mid-1970s.
California'sMedical Insurance Compensation Reform Act

1.

In May 1975, then California Governor Jerry Brown called a special
session of the legislature to resolve the crisis of skyrocketing medical
malpractice premiums.' 15 The ensuing legislation, the Medical Insurance
Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA"), 116 radically modified the remedies
available to injured patients.
MICRA, still in force today, imposes a bright-line US$ 250,000 cap
11 7
The MICRA cap
on non-economic damages in medical malpractice suits.
applies to all medical malpractice plaintiffs, regardless of the severity of the
injury, the gravity of the loss, or the absence of other means for
compensation. 1 8 The statute requires trial judges to reduce any jury award
in excess of the cap amount. 1 9
Supporters claim that MICRA subdued California's rocketing
insurance rates while simultaneously protecting access to courts and
ensuring adequate recovery for legitimate claims.120 Over MICRA's first
twenty-five years, California insurance premiums increased at one-third the
national rate-a 167% increase, compared to a 500% spike in rates for the
rest of the country. 121 California now boasts some of the lowest malpractice
113

See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

114 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

115See Ramey, supra note 37, at 625-26; Creation of MICRA, supra note 26.
116 Medical Insurance Compensation Reform Act, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949.
117 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2003). MICRA, codified in part as California Civil Code §
3333.2, reads:
In any action for injury against a health care provider based on
(a)
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
In no action shall the amount of damages for non-economic
(b)
losses exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
Id. Consumer advocates have sought to raise this amount, claiming it is outdated in light of inflation and
inadequate. See Ramey, supra note 37, at 628-29 (noting that US$ 250,000 in 1975 only equates to
US$ 83,000 today).
11 Id.
"9

Id.; see, e.g., Salgado v. County of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.4th 629, 967 P.2d 585 (1978).

121

See Loiacono, supra note 112; Physician Insurers Association of America, Debunking the May 29,

20 Health Care Liability Alliance, supra note 7.

2002 MalpracticePremium Analysis Publishedby the Centerfor Justice & Democracy, June 27, 2002 cited
in Washington State Medical-Education and Research Foundation, The Impact of Medical Malpractice
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premiums in the United States. 122 In turn, health care providers, especially
and neurosurgery, are
those in high-risk specialty areas such as 1obstetrics
23
able to obtain reasonably-priced insurance.
2.

Other States Following the Success of MICRA

Capping non-economic damage awards is now the standard model for
American liability reform. Other states have recognized MICRA's success
in California and followed suit by enacting identical or substantially similar
measures. 124 While permutations of the MICRA model exist, the basic
framework is consistent: a maximum cap on non-economic damage
awards. 25 Some state supreme courts have invalidated such legislation on
state constitutional grounds. 126 The fact that state legislatures continue to
Insurance and Tort Law on Washington's Health Care Delivery System, Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.wsma.org/TortrefornsLpdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2003). Empirical analysis suggests that
removing the $250,000 non-economic cap could increase the cost of health care in California by more than
Hamm Report, at http://www.capSee Legislative Comer,
per year.
billion
$6
mpt.com/legislative_comer/hamreport.html (last visited June 29, 2003); see also Ron Neupauer,
Medical Underwriters of California, 2002 California Large Loss Trend Study: A Survey of California
at
available
Million,
$1
over
Settlements
and
awards
Malpractice
http://www.miec.comflargeloss/losstrend2002.htm (last visited June 29, 2003).
.22Californians Allied for Patient Protection, The California Story, MICRA: A Successful Model for
Affordable and Accessible Health Care, available at http://www.micra.org (last visited June 25, 2003)
[hereinafter California Story]. In 1975, California physicians faced the highest medical malpractice rates in
the nation; now, however, California remains in the lower third. See Vandecruze, supra note 7. MICRA's
non-economic damages limits saved roughly US$ 516 million in claim payments over ten years. See
Ramey, supra note 37, at 633.
'2' See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 2-4.
124 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302(1) (2001) (US$ 250,000 limit on non-economic damages);

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.207(7)(b), 766.209(4)(a) (West 2001) (capping non-economic damages at
US$ 350,000 per incident if the claimant rejects voluntary binding arbitration); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7
(2001) (US$ 375,000 limit on damages for pain and suffering with certain classes of torts excepted); IDAHO
CODE § 6- 1603(1) (Michie 2001) (US$ 400,000 cap on non-economic damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 601903(a) (2001) (US$ 250,000 limit on non-economic damages in wrongful death action); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit., 24-A § 4313 (2001) (US$ 400,000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(2) (2001)
(US$ 500,000 limit on nonpunitive non-economic damages); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (Law. Coop. 2001) (US$ 500,000 limit on non-economic damages with exceptions); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.1483(1) (2001) (US$ 280,000 limit on non-economic damages with exceptions); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 538.210 (2001) (US$ 350,000 cap per defendant on non-economic damages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9411(1) (2001) (US$ 250,000 limit on non-economic damages in medical malpractice claim); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32- 42-02 (2001) (US$ 500,000 limit on non-economic damages); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11
(Michie 2002) (US$ 500,000 cap on non-economic damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2002)
(US$ 400,000 limit on nonpunitive, non-economic damages); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (Michie 2001)
(US$ 1,000,000 limit on non-economic damages in medical malpractice action); Wis. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d)
(2001) (US$ 350,000 cap on non-economic damages).
125 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126 E.g., Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998); Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio
St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809 (1995); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n,
592 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 349 (Utah 1989); Sofie v. Fibreboard
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mimic MICRA, however, evidences the prevalence and appeal of the
method. In the current crisis, states with non-economic damage caps enjoy
increased stability and controlled indemnity premiums.1 27 In contrast, states
hesitant care
lacking statutory reform face skyrocketing insurance rates,
28
care.1
health
to
access
affordable
in
crisis
a
and
providers,
3.

States Lacking Damage Caps

States without an effective non-economic damage award limitation
currently face the most severe problems with health care.' 29 This group
where the state supreme court struck down
includes states such as Florida,
30
MICRA-like legislation.
In recent years, multimillion-dollar jury awards have become more
common, and states without non-economic damage caps leave health care
providers subject to enormous liability.' 31 States that have no legislative
mechanism to control non-economic damage awards encounter the largest
In one year, the average
medical malpractice premium increases.'
premium in states lacking legislative caps, such as Illinois, Ohio, Nevada,
New York, and West Virginia, increased by as much as 44%, while states
with non-economic damage caps between US$ 133250,000 and US$ 350,000
experienced an average increase of 12% to 15%.
In states without caps, rising insurance rates significantly limit patient
access to adequate health care. 134 In July 2002, the Trauma Unit at the Las
Vegas University Medical Center, the only Level 1 trauma center in Nevada,
closed for ten days.135 Fifty-seven of fifty-eight orthopedic doctors resigned,
The Center reopened
citing sharp increases in their insurance premiums.'
Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987)
(per curium). Other states have upheld statutory caps on damages against constitutional challenges. E.g.,
Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 789, P.2d 541 (1990); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr.
Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989); Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d
585 (1980). See also Robert S. Peck, Caps on Damages: Adding Injury to Injury, TRIAL, at 22, Sept. 2002.
127See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 14-17.
128Id. at 12-14; see also Mills, supra note 1, at *77-78; California Story, supra note 122.
129See, e.g., Symposium, Monique A. Anawis, Tort Reform 2003, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309,
310 (2003); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 12-14.
130 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
t31 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 6-11.
132See id. at 12.
133Id. at 14.
134 See Vandecruze, supra note 7.
135Anawis, supra note 129, at 311. Similarly, in January 2003, West Virginia surgeons took a 30-day
leave of absence in protest of rising insurance premiums. Id. at 312.
136Id. at 311. Many of these Las Vegas doctors saw their medical malpractice insurance premiums
increase between US$ 40,000 and US$ 200,000. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note
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only after some physicians agreed to become county employees, thereby
cap.137
receiving the protection of a US$ 50,000 non-economic damage
The U.S. cap approach to non-economic damage awards certainly
addresses reform goals in that insurers no longer face the potential for
Simply setting a predetermined cap, however,
unlimited payouts.
significantly differs from the liability reform movement of Australia.

IV.

AUSTRALIAN

MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE

CRISIS:

CONTRIBUTING

FACTORS AND UNIFORM LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Increases in litigation have created a crisis in the Australian insurance
industry. Unlike the United States, Australia favors reform measures that
incorporate a calculation scheme for non-economic damages that bases
recovery on the loss incurred in a hypothetical "most extreme case."
A.

Factors (Not) Contributingto Australia's Crisis

Australia, like the United States, has also experienced an increasingly
litigious trend and inflated damage awards in connection with medical
malpractice suits.' 38 Reform proponents condemn Australia's litigious
system." 140
course,139 referring to it as the "Americanisation of the legal
Despite sharing an English common law heritage, the Australian and
14 1
For instance,
U.S. legal systems differ in several important aspects.
Australia does not use civil juries and attorneys are compensated according
backlog;
to an hourly wage-two features that help reduce litigation, judicial
42
costs associated with the American civil system.
and the high
In Australia, judges, not juries, generally assign fault and assess
4, at 2. Las Vegas patients depend on this trauma center; the next nearest Level 1 trauma center equipped
to treat the most severely injured patients is five hours away by car. Id.
137 See Vandecruze, supra note 7.
138See Kirby Speech, supra note 15; Premier Bob Carr, Civil Liability Amendment (Personal
Responsibility) Bill, Address to the Legislative Assembly (Second Reading), in HANSARD ExTRACT, Oct.
23, 2002 available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/phweb.nsf/frames/hansard (last visited
Oct. 25, 2003).
't See, generally, Naxakis v. West General Hospital, (1999) 197 CLR 269 (twelve-year-old boy sued
hospital for failing to conduct an angiogram, a procedure which may have diagnosed his head injury).
140See Carr,supra note 138. "If we look at the trends inthe United States, it is clear that the writing
is on the wall for us here in Australia,... [T]he American experience is a prediction of things to come in
Australia and we would do well to take note." Kirby Speech, supra note 15. "Overseas, the United States'
experience, in particular, shows what can happen if the legal system allows professional and occupational
liability to go unchecked." Mills, supra note 1, at *2.
141 See Ponte, supra note 64, at 339.
142 See Bernstein, supra note 64. The Australian legal system is inherently more procedurally and
substantively efficient and consistent than that of the United States. See Ponte, supra note 64, at 340-41.
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damages. 143 Using judges as finders of fact and law centralizes the decisionmaking power in those with the most expertise.1 44 While average persons
possess no legal training and may serve on a jury only a few times, judges
wield a breadth of legal knowledge and experience gained from numerous
lawsuits.1 45 Judges determine damage awards with the familiarity of prior
awards and similar claims.1 46 In turn, judges are less prone to render
decisions guided by sympathy or emotion and are less susceptible to
misdirection by counsel in assessing damages. 47 Finally, whereas juries
need not explain their reasoning or the method utilized in reaching a
judgment or verdict amount, 148 judges must justify their findings in their
opinions. 149 Final judgments, thus, bear more credibility and consistency. 150
In addition, the limitations Australia places on fees payable for legal
services reduce the incentive for attorneys to pursue speculative claims.' 5 '
Unlike U.S. attorneys, most Australian attorneys 152 are paid based on an
hourly wage. 53 The majority of Australian states and territories, either
through civil or criminal penalties, forbid fee agreements based on a
successful outcome.' 54 Three states have abolished such penalties, but still
refuse to embrace contingency fees.' 55 Instead, these Australian states and
territories employ conditional fee agreements-a premium payment based
143 See Ponte, supra note 64, at 340-41. For example, South Australia abolished jury trials in all civil
lawsuits. See Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 769, 775-76 (1995).
144See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 221 (noting that experienced judges will possess knowledge of other
cases and can approximate the "going rate" for pain and suffering in certain classes of injury).
145See id.
146Id. Use of prior decisions in assessing damage awards is a basis for many scholarly approaches to
reform. Schuck, supra note 73, at 216-17 (noting that "damage decisions by juries, . . . are more likely to
be fair and accurate if they are based on reliable information about awards in prior cases."); cf David
Andrew Ipp et al., Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report, 186-87, Sept. 2002 (recommending the
implementation of a Tariff System, whereby counsel and court may consider awards of non-economic
damages in prior cases) [hereinafter Ipp Report].
47 Cf Blumstein et al., supra note 105, at 177-78 (suggesting a most extreme measureimplementation of a schedule of damages, where injuries receive an amount prescribed by prior awards
resulting from similar injuries.).
148Blumstein et al., supra note 105, at 175 (labeling jury deliberations as a proverbial "black box").
149See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop Ltd. (T/as Dunlap Footwear) v. Rozina Krivec (1996), _ N.S.W.L.R.,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/nsw/supremect/95040172.html (last visited
Oct. 29, 2003).
Iso See VIDMAR, supranote 2.
151See Ponte, supra note 64, at 340-42.
1 In Australia, attorneys are often divided into two groups: solicitors and barristers. Id. at 342.
153Id. at 341; see also Martin, supra note 97, at 58; Mark, supra note 14, at 185.
"4 See Maintenance and Champerty Abolition Act, 1992, no. 88, 2 N.S.W. Stat. (1993) (N.S.W.);
Criminal Law Consolidation Act, 1935, sched. 11 § 1(3) (S. Austl.); Crimes Act, 1958, pt. IA § 322A
(Vict.); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
155See, e.g., Ponte, supra note 64, at 335-43.
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on the attorney's hourly wage.' 56 Because payment does not rely on the
on
amount recovered, attorneys are disinclined to pursue claims based solely 157
suits.
speculative
fewer
face
turn
in
insurers
and
payouts
large
potentially
Although it has a legal system less susceptible to excessive insurer
liability than the United States, Australia still experiences rising insurance
premiums. This phenomenon supports the notion that non-economic
damage awards play a significant role in the medical malpractice crisis.
B.

Australia'sLegislative Response: The "Most Extreme Case" Scheme

Throughout Australia, liability reform generally mirrors a model set
forth in New South Wales. Non-economic damage awards are calculated
according to each plaintiffs loss in relation to a hypothetical "most extreme
case."
1.

New South Wales and the Civil Liability Act

The state of New South Wales ("NSW") currently leads the Australian
tort reform movement and is used by policymakers in other jurisdictions as a
model for medical indemnity reform. This was not always so. 158 Prior to the
adoption of recent legislation, NSW was recognized as the most litigious and
plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction in Australia.1 59 In response, the NSW
government has since taken the lead in the tort reform movement. 6 ° NSW
courts now uniformly address virtually all negligence-based personal injury
or wrongful death claims, including medical-related injuries.
NSW first addressed the medical malpractice crisis when the
.56Conditional fees allow for payment of a premium amount upon the client's recovery, but base the
fee upon a percentage of the attorney's normal hourly wage for the services provided. See, e.g., Ponte,
supra note 64, at 335-43. For instance, in NSW, solicitors and barristers may legally enter cost agreements
with clients providing that payment is contingent on the successful outcome of the legal matter; and,
although the agreement may provide an amount more than the hourly wage, that premium is limited by
statute to a maximum of 25% above normal costs. Id. In South Australia, the maximum premium
permissible by statute is double the otherwise normal fees. Legal Profession Act, 1987, pt. 11, div. 3,
(N.S.W.). Only in unique cases is it permissible for costs to be calculated as a proportion of, or vary
according to, the amount recovered in the legal proceeding. Id.
157 See Ponte, supra note 64, at 335-43.
158 See AMA Report Card, supra note 19.
'59 In May 1996, Brendan Dooley, an Australian surgeon, stated: "Sydney is a cowboy town for
medical litigation ... second only to California." Greg J. Reinhardt, Compensation and Professional
Indemnity in Health Care- The FinalReport of the Tito Committee, TORTS L.J., at *1 (1996), availableat
LEXIS, News Library. See also Robert Gottliebsen, Tort Reform: Having Your Cake and Eating It,
AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 15, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library.
160 AMA Report Card,supra note 19.
161 Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 2, div. 1, § 11A (N.S.W.).
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Australian Parliament passed the Health Care Liability Act ("HCLA") on
June 29, 2001.162 The HCLA reformulated injured patients' right to recover
compensation for medical-related injuries by instituting damage restrictions
that substantially limited liability for malpractice claims based on
negligence.163 The reform package aimed to facilitate fair and sustainable
compensation for persons suffering severe injuries, to keep costs of medical
indemnity premiums at reasonable levels, and to maintain a full range of
64
medical services for the community.
One year later, in response to a persistent outcry regarding a public
liability crisis, 165 the NSW Parliament enacted the Civil Liability Act of
2002, which has since been amended by the Civil Liability (Personal
16 6
Drafters of the CLA
Responsibility) Amendment (collectively, "CLA").

noted the HCLA's effectiveness in stabilizing the turbulence of the medical
indemnity crisis' 6 7 and borrowed the provisions related to the calculation of
damages almost verbatim.' 61 The CLA provisions preempt the relevant
1 69
NSW lawmakers
portion of the HCLA with virtually identical language.
is a need for
there
that
belief
the
with
initiative
reform
the
approach
170
liability
guiding
standard
objective
an
of
lack
the
is,
That
consistency.
requires controlling the growth of the damage component.
The CLA provision relating to non-economic damages incorporates
three distinct parts: (1) a ceiling amount recoverable for non-economic
for calculating damage awards based upon a
damages; (2) a strict 17method
"most extreme case"; 1 and (3) a loss threshold below which non-economic
losses are not recoverable. 72 The relevant text of the CLA reads:

112Health Care Liability Act, 2001 (N.S.W.)
Id. at pt. 2.
Mr. Knowles, Health Care Liability Bill, Address to the Legislative Assembly (Second Reading),
in HANSARD EXTRACT, June 19, 2001 available at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/Phweb.nsf/frames/hansard (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
65 See, e.g., Parliament of Australia, supra note 45; Closure "Threat" to Australia's Beaches (May
14, 2002), at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1986591.stm (last visited June 23, 2003)
(discussing possible of beach closing after injured swimmer was awarded AU$ 3.75 million in damages).
'6 The CLA received royal assent on June 18, 2002; it applied retroactively to all suits commenced
from March 20, 2002. Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 1, sect 2 (N.S.W.).
167 John Della Bosca, Civil Liability Bill, Address to the Legislative Council (Second Reading), in
'

'6

HANSARD EXTRACT, June 4, 2002, available at

http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/phweb.nsf/frames/hansard (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
168 Compare Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16 (N.S.W.) with Health Care Liability Act,
2001,Ptt. 2, div. 3, § 13 (N.S.W.).
9 Civil Liability Act, sched. 2, Amendment of Acts (N.S.W.).
170 See Knowles supra, note 164.
'~'

Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16(3) (N.S.W.); see also infra Part IV.A.1.

172 Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16(1) (N.S.W.).
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Determination of damages for non-economic loss
(1)No damages may be awarded to a claimant for noneconomic loss unless the severity of the non-economic loss
is at least 15% of a most extreme case.
(2) The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded to a
claimant for non-economic loss is $350,000,173 but the
maximum amount is to be awarded only in a most extreme
case.
(3)If the severity of the non-economic loss is equal to or greater
than 15% of a most extreme case, the damages for noneconomic loss are to be determined in accordance with the
following Table:
Table

Severity of the non-economic
loss (as a proportion of a most
extreme case)

Damages for non-economic loss (as
a proportion of the maximum
amount that may be awarded for
non-economic loss)

15%

1%

16%
17%
18%
19%
20%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
26%
27%
28%
29%
30%
31%
32%
33%
34%- 100%

1.5%
2%
2.5%
3%
3.5%
4%
4.5%
5%
5.5%
6.5%
8%
10%
14%
18%
23%
26%
30%
33%
34% - 100% respectively

(4) An amount determined in accordance with subsection (3) is

173

But see infta notes 183 and 184 and accompanying text.
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to be rounded to the nearest $500.

174

Even after establishing a defendant's liability, a malpractice victim
175
The calculation
does not necessarily qualify for non-economic damages.
process:
three-step
a
requires
damages
of non-economic
Step 1: Determine the severity of the claimant's non-economic
loss as a proportion of a most extreme case. The proportion
should be expressed as a percentage.
Step 2: Confirm the maximum amount that may be awarded
extreme
under this section for non-economic loss in a most 17.
176
section
under
year
each
indexed
is
amount
This
case.
Step 3: Use the Table to determine the percentage of the
maximum amount payable in respect of the claim. The amount
payable under this section for non-economic loss is then
determined by multiplying the maximum amount that may be
awarded in a most extreme case by the percentage set out in the
Table.
Where the proportion of a most extreme case is greater than
33%, the amount payable will be the same proportion of the
maximum amount.
The purpose is to avoid disproportionate and inconsistent awards and
to provide efficient and adequate relief for those persons who suffer the most
severe injuries. 178 For instance, minimal non-economic losses, those less
79
than 15% of a "most extreme case," are not recoverable.1 Losses of at least
15% severity are compensated according to a percentage of the
80
Losses falling between 15% and
AU$ 350,000 maximum award amount.
a table determined by the
in
33% correspond to values set forth
74 Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16 (N.S.W.).

New Zealand and Sweden, countries that implement no-fault systems for medical-related
injuries, similarly impose minimum "disability thresholds" before recovery is available. See Studdert &
Brennan, supra note 20, at 232. In New Zealand, a person must spend fourteen days in the hospital or
twenty-eight days with a significant disability; in Sweden, the threshold requires ten days of hospitalization
175

Id.

or thirty sick days. Id.

176 The amount in Section 17 is AU$ 350,000, but has since been increased. See infra note 184.
' Civil Liability Act, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16, note (N.S.W.).
178Knowles, supra note 164.
179 Civil Liability Act, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16(1) (N.S.W.).
"0 Id. § 16(3).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 13 No. I

legislature.' 8 1 Losses 34% or greater are compensated according to that
percentage.' 82 That is, an injury resulting in the 50% non-economic loss
compared to a "most extreme case" will receive AU$ 175,000 in noneconomic damages. Section 17 of the CLA, however, provides for the
indexing of the maximum recoverable amount.' 83 Therefore, the statutory
cap-AU$ 350,000,8 4as enacted-may be adjusted yearly to reflect current
market conditions.'
2.

The Commonwealth Government Supports Reform

Australia has uniformly exhibited a commitment to the CLA's
treatment of non-economic damage awards on the federal and state levels.
Developing concern over sharply increasing public liability prompted the
Commonwealth government to initiate reform.'8 5 In May 2002, the
Commonwealth appointed an expert panel ("Panel") headed by Justice
David Andrew Ipp 16 to review the current state of the law of negligence and
inquire into a wholesale reform of tort law. 187 From the outset, the Panel
assumed that escalating damage 1awards
substantially contributed to the
88
materialization of a liability crisis.
In regard to non-economic loss, the final report ("Ipp Report") shares
the terms and provisions imposed by NSW's CLA and promotes the use of
both a damage calculation scheme based on a hypothetical "most extreme
case" and minimum loss thresholds.' 89 While the CLA imposes an
AU$ 350,000 maximum on damages for non-economic loss, the Ipp Report
recommends placing a ceiling at AU$ 250,000,190 but notes that each

s' Id. § 16(3).
182

Id.

183 Id. §

17.
"s Id. Amount declared for the purposes of Section 16(2) from October 1, 2002 is AU$ 365,000.
See NSW Dep't of Commerce, 160 Government Gazette 8495, Jan. 10, 2002, available at
http://www.cms.dpws.nsw.gov.au/Gazette/Gazette.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
55 Ipp Report, supra note 146, at ix, Terms of Reference.
16Justice Ipp has been an Acting Judge of Appeal, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South
Wales, since 2001 and Justice, Supreme Court of Western Australia, since 1989. He was admitted to the
Western Australian Bar in 1984 and appointed as a Queen's Counsel in 1985. Ipp Report, supra note 146,
at xiii (Panel of Eminent Persons).
187 See Lynden Griggs, Comment, Consumers and the Ipp Report into Negligence Reform,
COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J., at *3-4, Sept. 21, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library.
188The panel creating the Ipp Report set out under the presumption that "[t]he award of damages for
personal injury has become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for
those injured through the fault of another...." Ipp Report, supra note 146, at ix, Terms of Reference.
89 See id. at 188-95.
'90 Id. at 194.
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91
jurisdiction should determine that amount for itself1
If the Ipp Report recommendations are implemented, Australia's
current patchwork of laws will converge to create a homogeneous body of2
negligence law that furthers the interests of consistency and uniformity.
93
Although not binding, the Ipp Report carries persuasive value,' motivates
state and territory governments to formulate legislative initiatives of their
own, and confirms the nation's unified approach to liability reform.

3.

Other States and TerritoriesFollow Suit

The trend throughout the Australian states and territories evidences
eagerness to subdue the liability crisis through legislation similar to the
CLA. 194 The measures pursued by other Australian jurisdictions mirror the
policy and framework of the Ipp Report and follow the substantive measures
set forth by the CLA. 195 Reform proponents refer to the CLA as the most
96
comprehensive reform statute in Australia and "a triumph for common197
Therefore, it is appropriate to look to the CLA as a reform
sense."'
of the unified reform movement in Australia. While
representative
measure
crisis hampers the Australian health care industry,
malpractice
a medical
states and territories have established a
individual
the
and
Parliament
workable "most extreme case" solution.

at 195.
192See Griggs, supra note 187, at *6.
193For example, NSW government released the Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility)
Bill, proposing the tort law reform recommendations of the Ipp Report, within forty-eight hours of its
release. Tort Law Reform Steaming in Australia, DEF. CouNs. J., Oct. 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Librar" See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
'9' Id.

195South Australia similarly imposes limitations of recovery available to plaintiffs, including a
threshold barring non-economic losses and a maximum cap that affect both non-economic and economic
damages. This practice diverges from the other jurisdictions in the manner of determining those
benchmarks. South Australia implements a minimum threshold by rejecting the award of non-economic
damages unless the injured person's ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired for at least
seven days or medical expenses of at least the prescribed minimum have been reasonably incurred in
connection with the injury. See Wrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act,
2002 (S.Austl.) (effective December 1, 2002, amending the Wrongs Act 1936).
2002, availableat
'9 See AMA Report Card,supra note 19; Impact of the Civil Liability Act (NSf')
2
OL BILIT
http://www.goldbergs.com.au/news articles/THE%201MPACT%20OF%20THE%20CIVIL%
Y%20ACT.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
197See Carr,supra note 138.
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THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE IT REDUCES
LIABILITY AND INCREASES PREDICTABILITY IN SETTING INSURANCE
RATES

Although both Australia and the United States recognize the benefit of
injecting some degree of regularity into damage assessment, each country
approaches this phase of dispute resolution differently. The U.S. approach
enforces a bright-line cap on non-economic damages, above which no
amount is recoverable, but below which there can be great variability in each
case. 198 Australia, on the other hand, employs a system that narrows the
variability of damage amounts, thus improving insurers' ability to accurately
set premium rates. From the standpoint of health care providers, insurance
companies, and reform advocates, the Australian model is better equipped to
achieve underlying reform goals than the U.S. cap system. The Australian
approach significantly reduces health care providers' liability and achieves
the consistency and predictability that insurance companies require in order
to accurately set premium rates.
A.

The AustralianScheme Reduces Health CareProviders'Liability

Both U.S. and Australian reforms limit individual liability of health
care providers.' 99 Australia, however, incorporates a calculation process-a
scheme that reserves the maximum amount for only the most severely
injured 2 0 -and a threshold requirement-a minimum amount of loss before
recovery of non-economic damages is available. °1
These additional
measures form a superior reform model that substantially reduces liability.
1.

Limiting Maximum Recovery to a "Most Extreme Case "

Both U.S. and Australian reforms set forth a maximum amount for
which health care providers, and their insurers, are liable.20 2 Unlike the U.S.
cap system, however, the Australian approach reserves the maximum

19sSee, e.g., The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 464 (1879) (stating that "the result must be left to
turn mainly upon the good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal"); Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82,
93, 138 A.2d 713 (1958) (stating "[n]o market place exists at which such malaise [pain and suffering] is
bought and sold.... The varieties and degrees of pain are almost infinite.").
1" But comparesupra Part III.B with supra Part 1V.B.
200 See supra Part IV.B.I.
201 See supra Part IV.B.I.
202 Compare supra Part III.B with supra Part IV.B.
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amount for the most severe losses-a "most extreme case.

2 °3

In California, a jury is free to award any amount for pain and
suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, or other intangible non-economic losses
2°
based upon the jury's independent deliberations and conclusions of fact.
20 5
The assessment of damages is purely in the purview of the jury. After an
amount is submitted, the statute mandates that the trial judge reduce any
amount of non-economic damages to the statutory limit.20 6 Therefore, a
patient suffering from any impairment, even relatively minor losses, may
receive the maximum amount.
The Australian approach, on the other hand, is more controlled
because the maximum amount is reserved only for the most serious
injuries. 20 7 For example, in NSW, non-economic damage awards are
computed by evaluating the loss suffered by a particular plaintiff compared
to the loss endured by a hypothetical "most extreme case." Once settled,
that percentage of loss correlates to a value-a multiplier-set forth in the
statutory table, which operates to reduce the non-economic damage award
from the maximum amount. In short, the single, comprehensive process
used in Australia, rather than the two-step process used in the United
States-a jury award and a reduction by the trial judge-ensures that the
maximum statutory amount is reserved for those who actually suffer the
most severe harms.20 8

The difference between the two systems is best illustrated in
application. Suppose Patient brought his malpractice suit in the United
States where the MICRA model is followed. The jury may likely consider
Patient's subjective suffering and the egregiousness of Dr. Defendant's
conduct in returning an award amount for Patient's non-economic loss. If
that amount exceeded the statutory cap, the trial judge must reduce that
amount to the statutory cap. Patient, therefore, could receive any amount up
to the cap amount in non-economic damages. If, however, Patient filed suit
in Australia where the CLA model governs, the judge would first determine
what a "most extreme case" entails-for example, the complete
incapacitation of one's leg. Next, the judge would determine that the
severity of Patient's loss caused by the reduced motion of his knee correlates
203 Compare supra Part III.B with supra Part IV.B.
204 See supra Part III.A.2.a; see also supra note 12 & 198 and accompanying texts.
205See supra Part II.A.2.a; see also supra note 12 & 198 and accompanying texts.

206See, e.g., Salgado, 19 Cal.4th at 645, 967 P.2d at 594 (reducing award).
207 See supra Part IV.B.1.
208See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop Ltd. (T/as Dunlap Footwear) v. Rozina Krivec (1996), _ N.S.W.L.R.,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/nsw/supreme-ct95040172.htnll
Oct. 29, 2003).

(last visited
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to 30% of this "most extreme case." The CLA Table compensates a 30%
20 9
The
loss a damage award of 23% of the maximum amount recoverable.
judge would award Patient 23% of AU$ 350,000, the maximum amount
recoverable. Therefore, Patient would receive AU$ 80,500.
2.

Profitingfrom the Minimum Loss Threshold

The Australian approach further reduces the amount for which health
are liable in malpractice suits by imposing a minimum nonproviders
care
economic loss threshold. 210 The majority view in Australian jurisdictions,
of
represented by the CLA and the Ipp Report, requires a non-economic
21 loss
1
available.
is
recovery
before
case"
extreme
"most
a
of
15%
at least
Another hypothetical situation demonstrates the effect of imposing a
loss threshold on health care providers' liability. Suppose that Patient's
negligently treated knee equated to a 10% loss compared to a "most extreme
case." The statutory threshold would bar Patient's recovery of any noneconomic damages from Dr. Defendant and his indemnity insurer. By
comparison, a U.S. court, even one subject to MICRA-like reform, would
permit non-economic damages up to the statutory cap amount.
The ultimate advantage of the Australian system extends beyond the
simple reduction in payouts per claim. The U.S. damage cap affects severity
and regulates the size of a single judgment, but is less effective in battling
12
Australian reform, on
the costs incurred from the frequency of lawsuits.
fewer claims will
because
the other hand, reduces insurers' litigation costs
damage awards.
on
be litigated due to the strict statutory limitations
in
assessing nonEliminating "jackpot" awards and restricting the freedom
213
limited
certain
Further,
economic damages removes incentives to sue.
economic
the
modifies
also
but
recovery not only deters speculative suits
decision whether to pursue relatively minor injuries through tort. As a
result, patients who have suffered redressable injuries due to the negligent
conduct of their health care providers may opt out of litigation or pursue a
more cost-efficient form of dispute resolution if their non-economic losses

209 Civil Liability Act, 2002, pt. 2, div. 3, § 16(3) (N.S.W.).
20 Id. § 16(1).
2" Id. The threshold loss requirement does not affect recovery of economic losses.

See Wrongs

(Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act, 2002 (S. Austl.) (basing minimum loss of
patients on other standards).
212 See Danzon, supra note 47, at 416 (severity is reduced by 23%, but frequency is reduced by 13%).
213 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES supra note 4, at 8-11.
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214
do not satisfy the threshold amount.

B.

The AustralianApproach Improves Consistency and Predictability

The Australian approach produces more consistent and predictable
results than the U.S. cap system. As a result, insurers can more accurately
215
set rates.
Caps act as a maximum amount awardable in any given case,
but offer virtually no guidance in regard to consistency of damage awards.216
Australian maximum amounts, on the other hand, act not only as a
maximum, but also as the standard for assessing the actual amount
recoverable. While non-economic damage awards freely fluctuate under the
cap amount in the United States, strict adherence to the calculation of
damages in Australia achieves horizontal equity. 21 7 For example, insurers
can assume that less severe injuries will result in less severe awards. 2 8 In
application, insurance companies can analyze common injuries to accurately
assess the potential liability of the policyholder.
In the United States, the current system of calculating tort damages
lacks standards for uniform assessment. 2 19 Too much discretion and too
little information handed to layperson juries result in drastic variations
between damage awards for injuries of similar severity. 220 A proposed jury
instruction from California evinces the lack of guidance handed to civil
juries for non-economic losses:
Reasonable compensation for any pain, discomfort, fears,
anxiety and other mental and emotional distress suffered by the
214 See Ron Heinrich, Paper given to AFR Insurance Summit 2002, Public Liability: Slipping and
Falling or Regaining Balance (Nov. 29, 2002), at 12.
215 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES supra note 4.
216 See Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Challenging the Constitutionality of Tort "Reform",

ATLA's LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29:20 (2003), available at WESTLAW, ATLA-tort.
"Horizontal equity" refers to treating similarly situated people
217See Schuck, supra note 73, at 221.
in a similar manner and implies similarity in damage awards for similar injuries. See Dilts v. U.S., 845 F.
Supp. 1505, 1510 (D. Wyo. 1994).
218 For example, Vidmar separates the severity of malpractice injuries into five categories: (1)
Emotional or Minor Injury (e.g., fright, temporary pain and suffering, lacerations, contusions, minor scars,
rashes, no delays in recovery); (2) Temporary Disability (e.g., infection, miss setfracture, fall in hospital,
bums, surgical material left in body, drug side effect, delayed recovery; (3) Permanent Partial Disability
(e.g., loss of fingers, damage to organs, deafness, loss of one limb, eye, kidney, or lung); (4) Permanent
Total Disability (e.g., paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage, quadriplegia, lifelong care or
fatal prognosis); and (5) Death. VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 50. Because a jury is free to award any amount
it sees fit, the cap system fails to guarantee any correlation between severity of injury (or loss) and damage
award. For example, a claim concerning a surgical sponge negligently left in the body, a injury under
category two of the Vidmar scale, may result in the same award as a wrongful death action.
21 See Schuck, supra note 73, at 221.
220See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 185-89.
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plaintiff and caused by the injury [and for similar suffering
reasonably certain to be experienced in the future from the same
cause].
No definite standard [or method of calculation] is
prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for
pain and suffering . . .

In making an award for pain and

suffering you should exercise your authority with calm and
reasonable judgment and the damages you fix must be just and
reasonable in the light of the evidence.22 1
Essentially, the only guiding principle presented by this instruction is that
222 In
the amount should be "just and reasonable in light of the evidence.
contrast, the Australian model provides a detailed and defined calculation
223
By contrasting the lack of
scheme that judges, or even jurors, can follow.
guidance provided by U.S. jury instructions to the Australian calculation
scheme of non-economic damages, it is evident that the latter approach
ensures the consistency and certainty that U.S. reform lacks.
VI.

THE AUSTRALIAN SCHEME IS SUSTAINABLE IN THE UNITED STATES

Because reform legislation functions in conjunction with a broad
matrix of other institutions and regulatory agents, the effect of statutory
limits on recovery is properly understood within the appropriate structural
224
and societal context.. Yet, even in light of important differences between
the U.S. and Australian legal systems, the Australian-style reform could
stabilize U.S. malpractice insurance rates and alleviate the ongoing medical
malpractice crisis.
A.

The Australian Scheme Could Remedy Inefficiencies Inherent in the
U.S.Legal System

The formulaic Australian approach could effectively reduce the
litigious effect of certain unique features of the U.S. legal system and further
the goals of American medical malpractice reform. Damage awards do not
221 2 CAL. JURY INSTR.-CIV. 14.13 (9th ed.)
2 id.
223See supra Part IV.B. 1.
224See generally Angus Corbett, The (SelJ) Regulation of Law: A Synergistic Model of Tort Law and
Regulation, 25 UNSW L.J. 616 (2003). The problem should not be too easily attributed to a single origin;
rather, proper analysis should include the "broad matrix of institutional and legal concerns." Id. at 617.
The law of torts is a product of complex legal, social, historical, and economic factors.
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operate in isolation within the legal system 225 and certain elements that
226
promote speculative litigation are simply nonexistent in Australia.
Nonetheless, Australian-style reform is well-suited for the U.S. legal system.
It could achieve stability in the insurance market, despite the United States'
use of civil juries and contingency fee agreements.
1.

Reining in the U.S. Civil Jury

The calculation scheme and threshold loss requirement promoted by
Australian reform could stabilize the irregularity of damage awards and
alleviate the drawbacks of the civil jury system. Because layperson juries
can readily comprehend and apply this scheme, the quest for consistency and
predictability argues in favor of adopting the Australian model.
The Australian damage scheme surpasses other reform initiatives
designed to rein in juries because, as applied in the United States, it would
maintain the jury's role while providing clear guidance in deliberation and
concentrating attention on the victim-patients' harm, rather than the conduct
of the defendant. In light of the problems accompanying the jury system,
assessing non-economic damage awards as a function of a "most extreme
case" is more consistent with the goals of American reformers than the cap
system. Furthermore, by maintaining the determinative role of the jury and
preserving some flexibility for subjective considerations, the Australian
approach would be more amenable to consumer advocates than alternative
reform measures, such as a "no fault ' 227 or damage scheduling system.228
The Australian damage scheme could also relieve the procedural
hardships created by the jury system by increasing the consistency and
predictability of damage awards and by reducing the quantum of damages.
In the U.S. legal system, the Australian approach could guide juries to more
consistent and predictable results. Instead of blindly rendering a dollar
amount based on jurors' subjective notion of justice and fairness, juries
could return a percentage reflecting a patient's non-economic loss as
compared to a "most extreme case." The trial judge could then award the
225See id.at 648-50 (expressing the need to develop a multi-dimensional model describing the
interaction between tort law and other categories of law). The erroneous view that tort law acts
independently of other regulatory factors furthers the view that promoting personal responsibility through
tort reform will resolve the insurance crisis. Id. at 618.
226See Ponte, supra note 64, at 335-43; Bernstein, supra note 64.
227See, e.g., Studdert & Brennan, supra note 20, at 128 (recognizing that "no fault" systems
compensate injured persons regardless of whether the harm was caused by the fault of another).
228 See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering, " 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908 (1989). Damage scheduling generally refers to a system where a
particular injury is compensated a set amount. Id. at 928-29.
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actual dollar amount for non-economic damages by referring to a statutorilydefined table incorporating a legislatively-determined maximum amount for
a "most extreme case." Alternatively, even if the jury rendered the noneconomic damage award as a dollar amount, the clearly delineated
calculation scheme would escort jurors through the assessment process and
Unlike the
increase the likelihood of a fair and foreseeable amount.
229
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award as a plaintiff s loss relates to a "most extreme case"
limit the jury's freedom, thereby minimizing the possibility of a deviant
award. For instance, it is unlikely that a jury would extend the title of "most
extreme case" to the diminished range of motion in Patient's knee, but
would consider amputation or complete loss of use as within this extremely
narrow category.
The Australian calculation method, by basing the assessment of noneconomic compensation on the loss compared to a "most extreme case,"
directs attention to the injury itself and consequently deflects the influence
Further, the reality of Dr.
of subjective factors and emotional responses.
Defendant's negligent conduct plays a less significant role because jurors'
attention focuses on the resulting harm, and not the particular injury-causing
act or omission. Under the Australian approach, similar injuries should
result in reasonably similar non-economic damage awards. In turn, health
care providers and insurers are more able to accurately assess risk and
appropriately set premium rates.
2.

Removing the Incentives of Contingency Fee Agreements

Australian-style reform would further reduce health care provider
liability by removing the incentives created by contingency fee agreements.
A method of calculation that limits the freedom of civil juries in awarding
damages significantly diminishes the incentive to pursue more speculative
claims. Attorneys must assess the economic practicality of accepting cases
and must independently evaluate each claim. If attorneys knew the standard
of calculation and the value of a "most extreme case," they could more
accurately assess the approximate value of their cases. An attorney could
229See supra notes 84 and 221 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Steve Cohen, Malpractice: Behind a $26-Million Award to a Boy Injured in Surgery,
NEW YORK, Oct. 1, 1990, at 41-49 reprinted in VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 101-03 (reflecting on the
emotional testimony of a boy plaintiff that resulted in a US$ 26 million verdict).
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consider his client's harm and assign an approximation of the severity of
loss in relation to a "most extreme case." Because the Australian damage
scheme removes the potential for "jackpot" awards and makes potential
payouts more foreseeable, 23' attorneys are discouraged from pursuing
In response to the diminished frequency of
speculative litigation.
malpractice suits, medical insurers face an overall reduction in litigation
expenses. Lower payouts and better estimations regarding claim validity
will result in reduced premium rates.
Adequate Legal Recovery to U.S. Patients

B.

The Australian damage assessment method also serves as a flexible
model that will ensure fair compensation to negligently injured patients.
Part of the reason for its success in Australia is due to the limited monetary
recovery available to injured patients. Many groups, including consumer
protection advocates, oppose damage-capping legislation and consider such
legislation as substantially impinging on patients' rights.232 For instance,
caps deny wrongfully injured patients adequate compensation for harms
caused by their health care provider's negligence. 233 Australian-style reform
could alleviate such concerns.
The Australian approach creates the potential for improved
compensation, superior to the existing U.S. cap system or the alternative
methods readily suggested by scholars and reform proponents. Scholars
reject other reform measures, such as "no-fault" and strict damage schedule
systems, 234 criticizing the rudimentary nature by which awards are
assigned. 235 For example, these alternative reform approaches lack the
comprehensiveness to accommodate certain variables, such as the victim's
age and the duration of the injury.236 The Australian calculation scheme,
See supra Part IV.B.
232See generally, Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980)
231

(reasoning that damage

limits fail to provide adequate compensation while not ensuring a reduction in the number of claims filed);
see also Hunter & Doroshow, supra note 46; Zimmerman & Oster, supra note 8 (pointing at insurance
companies' business practices and the insurance cycle as the prominent catalyst behind rapidly increasing
insurance rates).
233 See generally, Hunter & Doroshow, supra note 46. While approximately 3% of hospital patients
are victims of medical error, the Institute of Medicine estimates that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients
die each year due to such mistakes. See Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health
System, Nov. 1999, available at http://www.nap.edu/html/to errishman/reportbrief.pdf (last visited
June 25, 2003).
234 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 73, at 213-14 (suggesting scheduling damages as a better approach to
tort reform).
231 See id. at 217.
236 Id.
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however, strikes a balance between complete jury discretion and an
imprecise categorization of injuries, and provides a flexible method whereby
jurors can account for mitigating or augmenting factors.
The adoption of the Australian method lays the foundation for
increased damage recovery for the most severely injured patients.
Opponents to the statutory cap commonly point to certain cases where a
and the jury's award was
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adoption of a definitive calculation scheme and the reduction
freedom in assessing damages diminish the risk of unwarranted jackpot
awards. With assurances in place that maximum awards are reserved for a
"most extreme case," legislatures could adjust the maximum amounts
available for non-economic loss. For example, a maximum award for noneconomic loss could be elevated to US$ 500,000, as long as the percentages
set forth in the statute would reduce awards for less severe losses. In such a
situation, the interests of negligently injured patients and medical insurers
are satisfied. Although in certain circumstances the insurer will have to pay
more than the current maximum amount, the reduced frequency and
increased predictability of these large awards will create an overall reduction
in insurer payouts.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Australian scheme, which bases recovery on a "most extreme
case," exists as an alternative model for effective medical malpractice
liability reform that the federal government and individual states should
follow to alleviate the current medical malpractice crisis. The Australian
approach is premised upon the goals of reducing health care providers'
liability and increasing the certainty by which insurers assess risk and set
rates. Limiting the maximum amount of damages through a legislativelydetermined calculation scheme and deterring or barring plaintiffs from
recovery of non-economic damages better serves reformers' underlying
goals of achieving stability in the health care industry than the current U.S.
cap system.
The Australian damage scheme further relieves the inefficiencies
237

E.g., Hunter & Doroshow, supra note 46.
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inherent in the U.S. legal system that also contribute to the crisis. By
removing the potential for "jackpot" jury awards and limiting the vast
uncertainty in health care providers' liability, Australian-style reform would
minimize the negative consequences of civil juries and contingency fee
agreements. The Australian reformulation of non-economic damage awards
minimizes uncertainty and effectively removes the existing motivations to
pursue speculative litigation. Indeed, because Australia is devoid of many of
the litigation-fostering features embedded within the U.S. system, the
Australian-style reform measures may achieve even greater success in the
United States. In the current medical malpractice crisis that plagues the U.S.
health care industry, the Australian reform scheme presents a viable and
desirable model for reform that should be considered as an alternative to the
U.S. non-economic damage cap approach.

